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UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES RAISED BY
FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION
J. VIRGIL MATTINGLYt
KEIRAN J. FALLON' t
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 7, 1997, Representative James Leach, Chairman
of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the United
States House of Representatives (Banking Committee), introduced
H.R. 10, the Financial Services Competition Act of 1997. H.R. 10
represents only the latest effort by Congress to achieve an elusive but
necessary goal-comprehensive modernization of the laws governing
our nation's banks and other financial intermediaries. After
numerous amendments, H.R. 10 passed the Banking Committee in
June 19971 and was referred to the House Committee on Commerce
(Commerce Committee) for consideration. On October 30, 1997, the
Commerce Committee approved a revised version of H.R. 10 that
differs from the bill passed by the Banking Committee on several
important issues, including the contentious issues associated with
bank insurance and securities activities.2 In light of the differences
between the Banking Committee and Commerce Committee bills and
the difficult policy issues underlying these differences, members of
the House were unable to devise a compromise bill in sufficient time
to bring H.R. 10 to the floor before the first session of the 105th
Congress concluded on November 13, 1997.
t General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; B.B.A.,
1966, J.D., 1969, George Washington University. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board or its staff.
t Staff Attorney, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; B.S.F.S., 1988,
Georgetown University; J.D., 1992, New York University.
1. See Financial Services Competition Act of 1997, in H.R. REP. No. 105-164, pt. 1
(1997) [hereinafter Banking Report]. The Banking Committee passed the bill by the vote of
28-26.
2. See Financial Services Act of 1997, in H.R. REP. No. 105-164, pt. 3 (1997)
[hereinafter Commerce Report]. The bill garnered fairly wide support in the Commerce
Committee, passing by a vote of 33-11.
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The Senate has not taken up the issue of financial
modernization in the 105th Congress and probably will not begin
hearings on the matter until the House completes action on H.R. 10.
Senator Alfonse D'Amato, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, however, has introduced a
financial modernization bill-S. 298-that differs significantly from
the bills passed by the Banking Committee and the Commerce
Committee during the last session.3
In light of this state of affairs, the prospects for financial
modernization legislation in the second session of the 105th
Congress, which began on January 27, 1998, remain unclear. On the
one hand, the numerous parties involved in the ongoing debate
regarding financial modernization-including the banking,
insurance, and securities industries, the Treasury Department, the
Federal Reserve Board (Fed), the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (Comptroller), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)-agree
that something needs to be done to prepare the American financial
system for the 21 st century.
The current bank regulatory framework was enacted when
bank products and services could practically and functionally be
separated from those offered by securities and insurance firms.
Rapid advances in computer and telecommunications technology,
however, have led to the development of new financial products that
blur the traditional line between banking, securities and insurance
products and services. Moreover, because financial products are
increasingly interchangeable, many consumers now seek the
convenience and flexibility to obtain most of their financially related
products and services from a single "supermarket" provider.
While these changes are transforming the financial services
marketplace, existing laws increasingly impede the ability of banking
organizations and other financial intermediaries to meet the demands
of their customers for the full range of functionally similar financial
products and services and to remain competitive with foreign firms
in the expanding global marketplace. Many in the insurance and
securities industries now view the banking laws as a significant
3. S. 298, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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impediment to their own business plans and competitiveness. While
banking organizations have found ways to enter the securities and
insurance businesses through administrative rulings by the banking
agencies, securities and insurance firms have found their efforts to
enter the banking industry largely blocked by the Glass-Steagall Act4
and the 1982 insurance amendments to the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 (BHC Act).5
If a general consensus exists among the banking, insurance
and securities industries that legislative reform is necessary, why
then has financial modernization been so difficult to achieve?
Financial modernization necessarily involves the consideration of a
wide array of important policy issues, such as whether combinations
of banking and commerce should be permitted; the proper role and
regulation of banks in the sale of securities and insurance; the
appropriate level of federal supervision of holding companies with
broad financial powers; and the most efficacious manner of ensuring
that any structural revision to our financial system occurs in a safe
and sound manner without undue risk to the federal safety net.
Although the various industries and supervisory agencies generally
agree that these issues need to be addressed, they have differing
views on precisely how they should be resolved.
Not surprisingly, many entities involved in the current debate
have sought to preserve those aspects of the current regulatory
structure that provide their own industry with some form of
competitive benefit, while at the same time seeking to break down
those barriers that restrict their ability to enter other fields. In
addition, each industry has sought to assure that any future regulatory
framework is as consistent as possible with the policies that have
4. The Glass-Steagall Act is the common name given to sections 16, 20, 21 and 32 of
the Banking Act of 1933. See Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). As discussed further
below, the Glass-Steagall Act generally prohibits national and state member banks from
underwriting or dealing in debt or equity securities other than specified types of debt
instruments (bank-ineligible securities). See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994). The Act also
prohibits a national or state member bank from being affiliated with an entity that is
"engaged principally" in underwriting or dealing in bank-ineligible securities. See
12 U.S.C. § 377.
5. See Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (1982) [hereinafter Gan-St. Germain Act]. Title VI of the Gain-St. Germain Act
amended the BHC Act to prohibit bank holding companies from engaging in, or being
affiliated with a company engaged in, insurance underwriting or agency activities, with
certain limited exceptions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).
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guided its particular industry in the past. The debate between banks
and insurance agents is the most prominent example of these
conflicts-while banks generally believe that financial
modernization legislation should expand (or at least not restrict) the
ability of banks to sell insurance or insurance-like financial products,
insurance agents believe that any legislation should curtail the
insurance activities of banks and subject any such activities to state
regulation.
In addition to these inter-industry issues, there are also
significant issues involving the regulation of the banking, securities
and insurance industries. For example, the SEC seeks to expand its
ability to regulate the securities activities of banks; the OCC seeks to
broaden the powers of national banks; the Fed seeks to maintain its
ability to supervise the financial system and major bank holding
companies; the Treasury Department seeks to expand its role in the
regulation of financial holding companies; and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) seeks to preserve the existing powers of thrifts
and thrift holding companies.
This complex matrix of policy, economic and supervisory
interests has made it difficult for members of Congress to fashion a
financial modernization proposal that enjoys sufficient support to
assure passage. This tangle of issues and interests also has made it
difficult for persons not intimately involved with the ongoing
legislative process to gain a clear understanding of the issues
involved and the progress that the Congress has made to date in
addressing these issues.
This Article is intended to assist the reader to understand the
significant policy issues involved with financial modernization
proposals. It provides an overview of the major policy issues
associated with financial modernization and discusses the positions
of the relevant industries and supervisory agencies on these issues.
In addition, the Article compares and contrasts how these issues are
addressed by the two versions of H.R. 10 recently reported out by the
Banking Committee and Commerce Committee.6
6. As noted above, the Senate has not yet scheduled hearings on financial
modernization and it is unclear what bills will serve as the initial basis for debate in the
chamber. Accordingly, this Article reserves for the footnotes a discussion of how Senator
D'Amato's bill, S. 298, addresses the major issues associated with financial modernization.
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II. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To understand financial modernization proposals, it is first
necessary to have a working knowledge of the existing bank
regulatory structure. Under current law, the powers of national banks
are generally limited to those authorized by the National Bank Act of
1864 (NBA),7 as amended. The NBA permits national banks to
engage in the "business of banking" and to exercise those incidental
powers necessary to carry on the business of banking.8 The Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, however, provides that such powers shall not
include the power to purchase equity securities for the bank's own
account or the power to underwrite or deal in debt or equity
securities, except for limited types of "bank-eligible" securities.9 The
NBA separately authorizes national banks located in places with a
population of 5,000 or less to act as agents in the sale of insurance
policies underwritten by unaffiliated insurance companies.'" As
traditionally interpreted, these provisions significantly limited the
ability of national banks to engage in securities activities as principal
or to engage in widespread insurance activities.
The BHC Act of 1956 limits the permissible activities and
affiliations of companies that control banks." As a general matter,
the BHC Act allows bank holding companies to engage in, or control
a company engaged in, any activity that the Fed determines is
"closely related to banking."' 2 In response to several actions by the
Fed in the 1970s and early 1980spermitting bank holding companies
to sell certain types of insurance, 3 the insurance industry persuaded
7. Act of June 3, 1864, 13 Stat. 100 (1864) (codified primarily at 12 U.S.C. § 21 et
seq.).
8. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
9. See id.
10. See id. § 92.
11. See id. §§ 1841-1850.
112. See id. § 1843(c)(8).
13. See Alabama Assoc. of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), on reh'g, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 904 (1978) (discussing Fed's actions authorizing bank holding companies to
engage in certain insurance activities). Interestingly, the BHC Act as originally enacted in
1956 specifically permitted bank holding companies to engage in any activity that the Fed
determined to be of a financial, fiduciary or insurance nature. See Act of May 9, 1956,
Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133, § 4(c)(6) (1956).
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Congress to pass the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, which
specifically provides that the Fed cannot consider the sale of
insurance, as principal or agent, to be an activity that is "closely
related to banking."' 4 As a result, the Fed may no longer authorize
bank holding companies to engage in, or affiliate with companies
engaged in, the underwriting or sale of insurance.
Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act also prohibits bank
holding companies that control member banks from controlling any
entity that is "engaged principally" in underwriting or dealing in
bank-ineligible securities. 5 The Fed has interpreted the "engaged
principally" language to permit bank holding companies to acquire or
establish subsidiaries that underwrite or deal in bank-ineligible
securities, if such subsidiaries do not receive more than twenty-
five percent of their revenue from underwriting or dealing in bank-
ineligible securities. 16 Nevertheless, section 20 continues to prevent
many large securities firms which cannot meet the twenty-five
percent revenue limitation from acquiring (or being acquired by) a
banking organization.
The existing financial landscape also includes savings
associations, commonly referred to as thrifts. Although initially
restricted to mortgage-related lending, federally chartered thrifts
today may make consumer and commercial loans (within certain
limits) 7 and may engage through subsidiary "service corporations"
in a wide variety of commercial activities.' Thrift holding
companies that control more than one thrift generally are permitted
to engage in only a limited set of financial activities. 9 Current law,
however, does not place any restrictions on the activities or
affiliations of so-called "unitary thrift holding companies," which are
companies that control only one savings association, provided that
14. U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). Certain limited exceptions to this general prohibition are
provided. See id.
15. See id. § 377.
16. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Securities Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank
Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing In Securities, 61 Fed. Reg.
68,750 (1996); J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., et al., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989), aff'd sub nom.
Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 900 F.2d
360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
17. See infra note 20.
18. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c).
19. See id. § 1467a(c).
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the company's thrift subsidiary engages primarily in housing-related
activities.2° Under this provision, industrial entities, securities firms,
and insurance companies may control a single savings association.
III. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH FINANCIAL REFORM
A. Banking and Commerce
Just a few years ago, much of the debate regarding financial
modernization focused on whether banks should be permitted to
affiliate with .securities firms, insurance companies and other entities
engaged in financial activities. Now, it is generally accepted that
banks should be permitted to affiliate with other financial service
providers and the debate has shifted to the corporate and regulatory
structure under which such affiliations should occur and whether
banks should be permitted to affiliate with companies engaged in
nonfinancial or commercial activities.
1. Should Banking and Commerce be Mixed?
The United States has a tradition of separating banking and
commerce, i.e., not allowing the combination of banks and
commercial or industrial firms within a single corporate structure.
The NBA generally restricts national banks to the "business of
banking" and incidental financial activities.2 Similarly, the BHC
Act generally prohibits banks from affiliating through a holding
company structure with firms engaged in activities that are not
"closely related to banking."22
This separation of banking and commerce in the American
economy has been maintained for a variety of reasons. Traditionally,
concern has existed that allowing the combination of banking and
business interests could lead to the concentration of economic power
20. See id. § 1467a(c)(3) & (in). In particular, the subsidiary thrift of a unitary thrift
holding company must comply with the "qualified thrift lender" (QTL) test, which
generally requires that the thrift be predominantly engaged in housing-related activities.
See id. § 1467a(m)(ii).
21. See id. § 24 (Seventh).
22. See id. § 1843(c)(8).
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in the hands of a small number of industrial-financial conglomerates.
In addition, allowing banks to affiliate with commercial firms may
produce conflicts of interest that interfere with the traditional role of
banks as impartial financial intermediaries. For example, a bank
affiliated with a commercial enterprise may face pressures to deny
credit requests from a competitor of its commercial affiliate.
Likewise, a bank affiliated with a commercial firm may face internal
pressures to extend credit to the commercial affiliate on favorable
terms or in situations when such credit would not normally be
extended.
Allowing banks and commercial firms to affiliate also could
lead to the expansion of the federal safety net. Supervisory and
empirical evidence suggests that holding companies act as unified
business entities, obtaining resources from healthy affiliates to aid
other affiliates in financial distress.23 As Walter Wriston, the former
Chairman of Citicorp once stated, "it is inconceivable that any major
bank would walk away from any subsidiary of its holding company.
If your name is on the door, all of your capital funds are going to be
behind [the subsidiary] in the real world."2' 4 Even if restrictions are
placed on transfers between federally insured banks and their
commercial affiliates, and such restrictions are effective," the
financial difficulties of a commercial affiliate could lead to a loss of
confidence in the bank affiliate because consumers and the
marketplace view holding companies as a single, unified entity.
Proponents of allowing a combination of banking and
commerce contend that such consolidations would allow banking
organizations to diversify their risk portfolios through expansion into
nonfinancial industries. Some proponents also contend that the
combination of banking and commerce would allow the resulting
organizations to achieve economies of scale and synergies that
currently are not possible through, for example, the cross-marketing
of products. Others claim that eliminating the barriers between
23. See An Analysis of the Concept of Corporate Separateness in BHC Regulation from
an Economic Perspective, in Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding
Companies: Hearings Before the Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, pt. 1, 99th Cong. 468
(1986) (Appendix 2-C).
24. Id. at 476.
25. See infra note 52 (discussing the effectiveness of firewalls).
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banking and commerce would allow banking organizations to attract
new capital from other industries. Finally, some proponents assert
that no significant regulatory problems have surfaced with unitary
thrift holding companies, which currently are permitted to own a
single savings association and engage in commercial activities.
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, has expressed concern with those proposals
that would permit the unlimited mixing of banking and commerce,
noting that such a change "would be a profound and surely
irreversible structural change in the American economy." 26 Because
existing law generally prohibits banking organizations from being
affiliated with commercial entities, little empirical evidence exists to
support the claims made in favor of mixing banking and commerce
to an unlimited extent.27 On the other hand, the recent difficulties of
financial institutions in certain Asian nations that permit extensive
ties between financial and commercial firms suggest that such
combinations present tangible risks. In addition, the banking
industry today is well capitalized by historical standards and, thus,
does not as a general matter require large scale capital infusions from
other sectors of the economy. In light of the irreversible nature of
such a change, and the continuing debate as to whether such a change
would result in net public benefits, Chairman Greenspan has
suggested that Congress should move cautiously in considering
whether to allow combinations of banking and commerce, 2' a
position supported by the OCC29 and FDIC.30
26. Financial Services Modernization: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House Committee on Banking and Financial
Services, 105th Cong. 433, 446 (1997) [hereinafter House Subcommittee Hearing]
(statement of Alan Greenspan).
27. See Financial Modernization: Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking
and Fin. Servs., pt. 1, 105th Cong. 8 (1997) [hereinafter Financial Modernization]
(statement of James L. Bothwell, Chief Economist, General Accounting Office). Although
unitary thrift holding companies are permitted to engage in commercial activities, only a
relatively small number of such holding companies currently exist and, as the OTS itself
has recognized, supervisory experience with the combination of banking and commerce
through these entities is limited. See Financial Modernization, supra, pt. 2 at 526
(statement of Nicholas Retsinas, Director, Office of Thrift Supervision).
28. See House Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 26, at 446 (statement of Alan
Greenspan).
29. See id. at 461 (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency).
30. See id. at 503 (statement of Ricki Heifer, Chairman, FDIC).
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Some argue that a limited mixing of banking and commerce,
however, may be necessary to allow consolidations in the financial
services industry itself. For example, some limited "basket" of
nonfinancial activities may be needed to allow securities firms and
insurance companies, which frequently have limited nonfinancial
holdings, to acquire banks. Some have argued that, given this need,
fairness would require that bank holding companies also receive the
benefit of any limited nonfinancial "basket" granted securities and
insurance firms.
2. Current Legislative Positions on Mixing Banking and Commerce
The bills passed by both the Banking Committee and the
Commerce Committee would allow the mixing of banking and
commerce subject to certain limits."' The Banking Committee's bill
would allow "qualifying bank holding companies" to receive up to
fifteen percent of their United States revenues from commercial
32activities. It is estimated that this revenue limit would allow the
largest banking organization to affiliate with any single commercial
firm in the United States other than one of the 200 largest.
The Commerce Committee took a much more cautious
approach to the issue, allowing financial services holding companies
to receive the lesser of 5 percent of their worldwide revenues or $500
million from commercial activities.33 The $500 million revenue limit
31. S. 298, on the other hand, would place no restrictions on the types of companies
that may be affiliated with a bank through a holding company structure and would thereby
allow the unlimited mixing of banking and commerce. See S. 298, 105th Cong. §§ 101(a)
& 104 (1997). Under S. 298, bank holding companies could acquire commercial firms of
any size and any commercial firm could acquire a bank of any size. See S. 298 § 104.
32. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 103. Under the Banking Committee bill, a
bank holding company would be a "qualifying bank holding company" if all of its
subsidiary depository institutions are well capitalized and well managed, have a
"satisfactory" or better rating under the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-
2906 (CRA), and have a demonstrable record of providing low-cost "lifeline" deposit
accounts. See id. In addition, if the bank holding company (or an affiliate) underwrites or
sells annuities or insurance, the bank holding company (or the affiliate) must not be in
violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) or any consent decree or settlement agreement
premised on a violation of the FHA. See id. The bank holding company also must limit its
activities to those permissible for qualifying bank holding companies and file a declaration
with the Fed. See id. As a practical matter, it is anticipated that most bank holding
companies would meet the criteria to be qualifying bank holding companies.
33. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, §133. The Commerce Committee's version of
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contained in the Commerce Committee bill is designed to prevent
banks from affiliating with any of the approximately 1500 largest
industrial firms.34 The revenue limits adopted by both the Banking
and Commerce Committees are continuing limits and, thus, prohibit
a nonfinancial affiliate of a financial services holding company from
growing, either internally or through acquisitions, if such actions
would cause the holding company's nonfinancial revenues to exceed
the relevant limits set forth in the bills.
Although the Commerce Committee bill provides for a lower
revenue cap on nonfinancial activities, the Commerce Committee bill
would also grandfather the nonfinancial activities of companies that
become financial services holding companies, provided that the
revenues derived by the holding company from such nonfinancial
activities did not exceed fifteen percent of the company's gross
revenues on the day before the company became a qualified bank
holding company."5 The bill would accord such grandfather rights
only to nonfinancial investments and activities held as of September
30, 1997.36
Both the Banking Committee and Commerce Committee bills
also prohibit financial services holding companies from acquiring the
shares of any commercial company that had total consolidated assets
of more than $750 million at the time of acquisition.37 This asset
limitation is designed to prevent the establishment of excessively
large financial-industrial conglomerates by prohibiting the
combination of banking organizations with any of the largest
1000 commercial companies in the United States.
H.R. 10 uses the term "financial holding company" in place of the term "qualifying bank
holding company" in the Banking Committee bill. The criteria for a bank holding company
to be a "financial holding company" under the Commerce Committee's bill are substantially
identical to those for "qualifying bank holding companies" under the Banking Committee's
bill, except that the Commerce Committee bill eliminates the FHA compliance and
"lifeline" account requirements. See id. For ease of reference, this Article will refer to both
"qualifying bank holding companies" (Banking Committee bill) and "financial holding
companies" (Commerce Committee bill) as "financial services holding companies."
34. To prevent the worldwide nonfinancial revenue limit from unduly restricting the
overseas activities of foreign banks, the Commerce Committee bill would impose a separate
limit on foreign banks that is based on the nonfinancial revenues such entities derive from
their United States activities. See id.
35. See id.. Existing bank holding companies and foreign banks would not be eligible
for these grandfather rights. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 103; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 133.
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Unlike the revenue limits discussed above, this asset limit
would apply only at the time of acquisition of a nonfinancial
company. Thus, if a financial services holding company acquired a
nonfinancial company with $749 million in consolidated assets, the
nonfinancial company could expand its assets through internal
growth or other acquisitions that themselves fell within the asset
limit, provided that the revenue derived by the financial services
holding company from nonfinancial activities did not exceed the
appropriate revenue limit imposed by the bills.
The Banking and Commerce Committee bills, however, also
permit financial services holding companies to invest in commercial
entities in a variety of indirect ways. For example, as discussed
further below, both bills permit financial services holding companies
to engage in merchant banking activities and would permit the
insurance affiliates of a financial services holding company to make
investments in the ordinary course of the affiliate's insurance
business as authorized under state law.3" Under these provisions, the
merchant banking and insurance affiliates of a financial services
holding company could make controlling, portfolio investments in
nonfinancial companies and, thereby, increase the holding
company's overall exposure to commercial activities.39 Both bills,
however, would prohibit the insured subsidiary banks of a financial
services holding company from making loans or other extensions of
credit to a portfolio company that was engaged in commercial
activities and controlled by an affiliate engaged in merchant banking
or insurance-related investment activities. The Commerce
Committee bill would also prohibit the holding company's insured
subsidiary banks from making a loan or other extension of credit to,
or engaging in any cross-marketing activities with, an affiliate
engaged in merchant banking or insurance-related investment
activities. 0
The Banking Committee bill, unlike the Commerce
Committee bill, also would allow commercial companies to have a
limited basket of banking assets. Under this "reverse basket," a
38. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 103; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 133.
39. The companies that a merchant banking or insurance affiliate may invest in are
frequently referred to as "portfolio companies."
40. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 103.
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commercial company could acquire one existing bank with assets of
$500 million or less at the time of acquisition.4' At no time could the
bank's revenue account for more than fifteen percent of the
commercial company's domestic gross revenues. In addition, the bill
would prohibit the commercial company from directly or indirectly
acquiring additional banks.
A commercial company that acquired a bank through this
"reverse basket," however, would not be treated as a bank holding
company and, thus, would not be subject to supervision by the Fed or
other federal banking agency. By exempting the ultimate
commercial parent from supervision on a consolidated basis, the bill
would make it difficult for the federal banking agencies to
understand and monitor the special risks that may arise from the
affiliation of banks with commercial firms and to ensure that such
risks do not endanger the safety and soundness of any insured bank.
These risks are discussed in more detail in section C of Part III.
B. Expanded Bank Holding Company Financial Affiliations and
Powers
Although there is great debate as to whether the mixing of
banking and commerce should be permitted, there is, as noted, a
general consensus that any legislation should authorize banking
organizations to affiliate with a broad spectrum of entities engaged in
financial activities, including securities brokers and dealers,
investment advisers, and companies engaged in underwriting and
selling insurance products. Due in large part to this general
consensus of opinion, the bills passed by both the Banking and
Commerce Committees would significantly expand the range of
financial activities that may be conducted by bank holding
companies and their nonbank affiliates.43 In particular, both bills
41. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 106. The bank acquired must have been in
existence for at least five years prior to its acquisition by the commercial firm. See id.
42. The bill would require, however, that the commercial parent control its banking
subsidiary through a subsidiary that itself was a qualifying bank holding company subject
to Fed supervision. See id.
43. As noted above, S. 298 would allow bank holding companies to affiliate with any
company and, accordingly, would permit bank holding companies to affiliate with securities
firms, insurance companies, or other companies engaged in financial or nonfinancial
1998]
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would repeal section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which currently
restricts the ability of bank holding companies to affiliate with
securities firms." In addition, both bills would repeal those
provisions of the Gain-St. Germain Act that prohibit bank holding
companies from engaging in, or being affiliated with a company
engaged in, insurance underwriting or agency activities.45
In place of these restrictions, both bills would specifically
authorize any bank holding company that met the criteria to be a
financial services holding company to engage in, or affiliate with
companies engaged in: (1) securities underwriting and dealing
activities; (2) merchant banking activities; and (3) insurance
underwriting, brokerage and agency activities.46 In addition, both
versions would specifically allow the insurance company affiliates of
a financial services holding company to make portfolio investments
in other companies in the ordinary course of the insurance affiliate's
business, provided that the bank holding company did not participate
in the day-to-day management or operation of the portfolio company.
The effect of these changes would be to permit the affiliation of
banking, insurance and securities firms under the aegis of a qualified
bank holding company.47
Both the Banking and Commerce Committee bills also would
permit financial services holding companies to engage in other
financial activities that are specifically listed in the bills, including
providing financial, investment or economic advisory services. In
addition, both bills would allow financial services holding companies
to engage in other activities that are not listed in the bills if the
activities are determined to be financially related (or incidental to
financially related activities) in the future. Although both bills
activities.
44. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 101; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 101.
Both bills would also repeal section 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act (12 U.S.C. § 78), which
prohibits officer, director, and employee interlocks between a company "primarily engaged
in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of bank-ineligible
securities and any member bank, except as authorized by the Fed. See id.
45. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 103; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 102.
46. Banking Report, supra note 1, § 103; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 103.
47. Bank holding companies that failed to meet the criteria to be a financial services
holding company under the Banking Committee and Commerce Committee bills would
generally be limited to engaging in those activities that are permissible for bank holding
companies under existing law, with certain exceptions. See Banking Report, supra note I,
§ 103; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 102.
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contain very broad language concerning the types of factors that may
be considered in determining whether future activities are financial,
the bills assign responsibility for making such determinations to
different bodies. On the one hand, the Banking Committee bill
would vest responsibility for determining whether a new activity is
financial with a newly formed National Council on Financial
Services (National Council).48 The Commerce Committee bill, on
the other hand, would continue the long-established role of the Fed in
determining the extent of permissible activities for bank holding
companies.49
C. Consolidated Supervision of Financial Service Holding
Companies
Proposals to allow banks to affiliate with securities firms and
insurance companies within the structure of a financial services
holding company necessarily raise the issue of how such new
holding companies should be supervised. Under existing law, the
Fed acts as the "umbrella" supervisor of all bank holding companies.
As such, the Fed has the authority to obtain reports from and
examine any bank holding company or subsidiary of a bank holding
company and to take enforcement action against any such company
or subsidiary for violations of law or unsafe or unsound practices.
To assure that bank holding companies have adequate resources to
support their operations, the Fed also has adopted capital adequacy
guidelines that require bank holding companies to maintain adequate
levels of capital on a consolidated basis.
48. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 103. The National Council would consist of
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Fed, the Chairperson of the FDIC, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairman of the SEC, the Chairman of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, and four individuals appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. See id. at § 121. Of the four individuals appointed by the
President, one must have experience with state securities regulation, one must have
experience with state banking regulation, and two must have experience with state
insurance regulation. See id.
49. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 103.
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1. Need for Prudent Level of Umbrella Supervision
Some, including trade groups for the securities and insurance
industries, have expressed concern that the existing bank holding
company supervisory framework may not be the appropriate model
for supervising holding companies engaged in a wide range of
financial activities. They claim that a financial services holding
company and its subsidiaries should be subject to regulation solely
on a functional basis. Under such a functional regulation scheme, the
bank subsidiaries of a financial services holding company would be
regulated by the appropriate federal banking agency; any securities
or investment adviser affiliate of the holding company would be
regulated solely by the SEC; and any insurance affiliate would be
regulated solely by the appropriate state insurance authority. The
parent financial services holding company, however, would not be
subject to supervision on a consolidated basis.
According to proponents of such a system, the functional
regulation of activities would continue to allow the federal banking
regulators to protect a subsidiary bank from risks arising in other
parts of the holding company through the imposition of capital
requirements or restrictions on the subsidiary bank itself. In
addition, proponents assert that a system based on functional
regulation would obviate the risk that an umbrella supervisor would
adopt duplicative, costly and burdensome regulations affecting
nonbank subsidiaries that are regulated by another federal or state
agency. Some also have expressed concern that an umbrella
regulator could significantly interfere with the operations of a
securities or insurance affiliate by imposing more severe capital,
reporting or examination requirements on the affiliate than those
imposed by the affiliate's functional regulator.
In the view of Chairman Greenspan, Paul Volcker, former
Chairman of the Fed, and the General Accounting Office, some form
of umbrella supervision of a financial services holding company with
a significant banking presence is necessary to protect the financial
system and guard against the misuse of bank resources."0
50. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 26, at 441-42 (statement of Alan
Greenspan) and 567 (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, James D. Wolfesohn, Inc.);
Financial Modernization, supra note 27, at 8 (testimony of James L. Bothwell, Chief
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Supervisory experience demonstrates that most holding companies
operate as integrated organizations, both for operational and risk-
management purposes. Thus, holding companies increasingly utilize
centralized risk-management systems and procedures to monitor and
manage the risks facing the holding company on a consolidated
basis. Because a financial services holding company also would
likely utilize centralized risk-management systems to monitor its
exposure on a consolidated basis, some form of umbrella oversight is
necessary to allow federal supervisors to adequately understand and
evaluate the potential risks facing the holding company and its
subsidiary banks.
In addition, as the recent experience of Barings PLC
illustrates, financial troubles at one affiliate of a holding company
can quickly spread to other affiliates. Umbrella supervision provides
the federal supervisory agencies with the ability to identify problems
within the organization as a whole, or at an affiliate of an insured
bank, at an early stage and to develop strategies to protect the insured
bank before significant harm occurs. Although "firewalls" such as
sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act 1 are extremely
important in protecting against the misuse of a bank's insured
deposits, experience has shown that such firewalls are not always
fully effective, particularly in times of financial stress.5 2  The
effective enforcement of these firewalls, moreover, requires that
federal supervisors have the ability to monitor both sides of
transactions between an insured bank and its affiliates.
Finally, it is possible that many of the concerns expressed by
members of the securities and insurance industries with respect to
Economist, General Accounting Office).
51. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (1994).
52. For example, in December 1986, the Comptroller authorized Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago (Continental Bank) to acquire First Options
of Chicago, Inc. (First Options). In connection with this approval, the OCC imposed a
condition that the bank's investment in and loans to First Options not exceed the amount
that the bank could lend to an unaffiliated entity under 12 U.S.C. § 24. Following the stock
market crash of October 19, 1987, First Options experienced severe financial difficulties.
Continental Illinois responded to this crisis by providing First Options with an unsecured
loan of approximately $130 million, even though this loan violated the funding "firewall"
imposed by the OCC and even though the OCC informed the bank before the loan was
made that the transaction would violate the firewall. See Volatility in Global Securities
Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 10 (1988) (statement of Emory W.
Rushton, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency for Multinational Banking).
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consolidated supervision may be based on a lack of familiarity with
how the Fed exercises its current supervisory authority over bank
holding companies. Although the Fed currently has the statutory
authority to examine and require reports from the nonbank
subsidiaries of bank holding companies, the Fed does not conduct
routine or periodic examinations of nonbank affiliates under the BHC
Act or require reports from such affiliates (other than section 20
subsidiaries). 3 In addition, although the Fed has adopted prudent
capital requirements for bank holding companies which apply on a
consolidated basis,54 the Fed has not promulgated capital adequacy
regulations for nonbank affiliates of bank holding companies.
2. Current Legislative Proposals
The Banking Committee and Commerce Committee bills
seek to strike an appropriate balance between the need for some form
of umbrella supervision and the desire of all parties to avoid the
unnecessary regulation of financial services holding companies and
their nonbank affiliates. Both the Banking Committee and
Commerce Committee bills would continue the Fed's traditional role
as umbrella supervisor of holding companies that control banks. In
addition, although both bills would continue the Fed's authority to
receive reports from and examine and adopt capital guidelines for
bank holding companies, the bills contain several restraints on this
authority. These restraints, which are generally consistent with the
Fed's current supervisory practices, are designed to minimize
potential disruptions to the activities of functionally regulated
nonbank affiliates."
53. The Fed obtains periodic reports from section 20 subsidiaries to monitor the
subsidiaries' compliance with the 25% revenue limitation imposed pursuant to section 20 of
Glass-Steagall Act. As noted above, however, both the Banking Committee and Commerce
Committee bills would repeal section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
54. See 12 C.F.R. § 225, app. A-B (1997).
55. S. 298 would take a more limited approach to the supervision of financial services
holding companies than both the Banking Committee and Commerce Committee bills.
Under S. 298, no federal agency would have the ability or authority to supervise a financial
services holding company on a consolidated basis. The authority of the federal banking
agencies would generally be limited to examining and supervising the subsidiary depository
institutions of a financial services holding company, although they could obtain reports
from or examine a nonbank affiliate to assure compliance by a depository institution with
specified provisions of federal law. See S. 298, 105th Cong. § 101(i)(3) (1997). In
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For example, both the Banking Committee and Commerce
Committee bills would allow the Fed to require reports from
financial services holding companies.56 To avoid unnecessary costs,
however, the bills require that the Fed accept, to the fullest extent
possible, the reports filed by a financial services holding company
with other federal or state supervisors, such as the SEC, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission or state insurance
authorities. Both bills would also require that the Fed, to the fullest
extent possible, use information that is otherwise publicly available
in lieu of any reporting requirement.
The bills would specify that the Fed may conduct an
examination of a financial services holding company or a subsidiary
thereof only for purposes of informing the Fed of the nature of the
operations and financial condition of the company or subsidiary, or
to inform the Fed of the nature of the financial and operational risks
within the holding company system that may pose a threat to the
safety and soundness of a subsidiary depository institution and the
systems for monitoring and controlling such risks.57 Both bills,
moreover, would require that the Fed limit the focus of any
examination to the parent financial services holding company and
those of its affiliates that, for specified reasons, may have a
materially adverse effect on the safety and soundness of the holding
company's subsidiary depository institutions.58 In addition, both
addition, S. 298 would prohibit the federal banking agencies from directly or indirectly
imposing any capital requirement on a financial services holding company. See id.
§ 1O1(d)(3).
56. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 131; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 111.
The Commerce Committee bill also would authorize the Fed to receive reports from the
subsidiaries of a financial services holding company.
57. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 131; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 111.
The Fed also could conduct an examination of a financial services holding company or a
subsidiary to monitor compliance by the company with the BHC Act and the provisions of
federal law governing transactions between depository institutions and their affiliates. See
Banking Report, supra note 1, § 131; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 111.
58. Under the Commerce Committee bill, the Fed could not examine a nonbank
subsidiary of a financial services holding company that was registered with the SEC as a
broker or dealer, or was subject to supervision by a state insurance authority unless (1) the
Fed had reasonable cause to believe that the subsidiary was engaged in activities that pose a
material risk to an affiliated depository institution, or (2) the Fed had reasonable cause to
believe that the subsidiary was not in compliance with the BHC Act or the laws governing
transactions with affiliated depository institutions and the Fed could not determine such
compliance through the examination of the holding company or its subsidiary depository
institutions. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 111.
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bills would require that the Fed accept, to the fullest extent possible,
reports of examinations prepared by a nonbank affiliate's appropriate
functional regulator.
Finally, both bills would prohibit the Fed from imposing any
capital adequacy requirements on any nonbank affiliate of a financial
services holding company that is an insurance company or registered
broker or dealer, provided that the affiliate is in compliance with
applicable capital requirements of its appropriate state insurance
authority or the SEC, respectively. 9 The Banking Committee bill
would also prohibit the Fed from imposing any capital adequacy
guidelines on financial services holding companies that were not
based on appropriate risk-weightings of the companies' assets.
D. Securities Activities of Banks
One of the more technical and contentious issues related to
financial modernization is the extent to which the securities activities
of banks should be functionally regulated and thus subject to SEC
supervision. Currently, banks are excluded from the definition of
"broker" and "dealer" in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act)." As a result, banks may conduct those securities
activities permissible under federal or state banking laws without
registering as a broker or dealer with the SEC and without complying
with the capital and other regulations adopted by the SEC for
registered brokers and dealers." Instead, bank securities activities
are primarily regulated by their appropriate federal or state banking
supervisors.
The blanket exemption for banks from the definitions of
broker and dealer was enacted by Congress in 1934. At that time,
following passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, the securities activities
59. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 133; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 111.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (1994). The Exchange Act defines a "bank" to mean any
national bank, any state bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System and any other
banking institution a substantial portion of the business of which consists of receiving
deposits or exercising fiduciary powers similar to those permitted national banks. See id. at
§ 78c(a)(6). Affiliates and subsidiaries of banks are not considered "banks" for purposes of
the Exchange Act and, accordingly, must register as brokers or dealers if engaged in
securities activities.
61. Bank securities activities are, however, subject to the general antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws.
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of most banks were limited to executing brokerage transactions for
their trust or fiduciary accounts or for other customers on an
accommodation basis. Since 1934, however, banks have become
increasingly active in the securities business. For example, many
banks today offer brokerage services to the general public; engage in
the sale of mutual funds; assist issuers in the private placement of
their securities; issue asset-backed securities representing interests in
loans originated or purchased by the bank; or act as principal in the
sale of derivative instruments that may have certain characteristics of
a security.
The growth of bank securities activities has occurred largely
in response to the natural development of traditional bank services
and bank efforts to stem the loss of their valued corporate customers
to nonbank competitors. For example, banks today provide a wide
variety of securities processing services in connection with their role
as trustee or custodian for corporations, mutual funds, public and
private retirement, profit-sharing and stock purchase plans. In
addition, banks developed the ability to privately place securities as a
mechanism to retain their relationships with major corporate clients,
who were increasingly satisfying their need for operating capital by
issuing commercial paper rather than obtaining short-term bank
loans.
1. Calls for Functional Regulation
The substantial growth of bank securities activities has led the
SEC and certain other groups to call for the elimination of the bank
exemption from the definitions of broker and dealer in the Exchange
Act. Proponents of such a change contend that the securities
activities of banks should be functionally regulated, i.e., subject to
the federal securities laws and SEC regulations to the same extent as
the securities activities of nonbanking organizations. According to
proponents of this view, functional regulation is necessary to assure
that all purchasers of securities benefit from the consumer protection
provisions applicable to registered brokers and dealers. These rules
include the SEC's minimum net capital requirements and the Rules
of Fair Practice adopted by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, which impose certain qualification and training obligations
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on securities sales personnel. Subjecting bank securities activities to
these rules and regulations, it is argued, would enhance consumer
protection and create a level playing field among all entities engaged
in securities activities.
Although the debate on this issue is frequently characterized
as one pitting "functional regulation" against the desire of the
banking industry to retain an outdated exception to the securities
laws, the debate in reality is considerably more limited and focused.
The banking industry for the most part has acknowledged that the
blanket exemption provided banks in the Exchange Act may no
longer be appropriate. Banks, however, insist that any revocation of
this blanket exemption must be accompanied by changes that permit
banks to continue to conduct those securities activities that are
integrally related to traditional bank functions-such as trust,
custody and safekeeping operations-within the bank. Accordingly,
the current debate focuses on the types of securities transactions that
a bank should be permitted to engage in without registering as a
broker or dealer.
2. Legislative Responses
Both the Banking Committee and Commerce Committee bills
would eliminate the blanket exemption provided banks from the
definitions of "broker" and "dealer" in the Exchange Act. Instead,
both bills would allow a bank to avoid registration as a broker or
dealer only if the bank limited its securities activities to specified
types of "exempted" transactions or activities. As they say, however,
the devil is in the details.
The exemptions provided by the Banking Committee bill are
fairly broad and would encompass most of the securities activities
conducted by banks in connection with their traditional banking
operations. For example, the Banking Committee bill would allow
banks, without registering as a broker or dealer, to privately place
securities with accredited investors;62  engage in securities
62. Under the Banking Committee bill, the term "accredited investor" would have the
same meaning given that term by the SEC under the federal securities laws. See Banking
Report, supra note 1, §§ 201, 202. Thus, the term would include institutional investors and
individuals that meet specified financial criteria. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1997).
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transactions in connection with their trust, safekeeping, custodial,
clearing, settlement and securities lending operations; effect
transactions for employee or shareholder benefit plans, such as
pension, retirement, and stock purchase and option plans; and sell
asset-backed securities representing interests in obligations
originated or purchased by the bank or any of its affiliates to
accredited investors.63 The Banking Committee bill also would
authorize banks to purchase and sell traditional banking products,
such as deposit instruments, letters of credit, loan participations and
swap agreements without registering as a broker or dealer, and would
authorize the Fed to determine whether future products constituted
banking products for these purposes.
The Banking Committee bill also provided two exemptions
that many small banks found particularly useful. First, the bill would
permit banks, without registering as a broker, to effect securities
trades solely as an accommodation for their customers, provided that
the bank did not publicly solicit securities transactions or receive
incentive compensation in connection with the transactions.'
Second, the bill would allow banks that do not have a broker-dealer
affiliate to avoid registration even if they acted as a broker in a de
minimis number of securities transactions per year (up to 1000) that
did not qualify for certain other exemptions provided by the bill.
Although the banking industry generally was willing to accept the
securities-related amendments contained in the Banking Committee
bill, the SEC believed that the amendments continued to exempt too
many bank activities from the agency's jurisdiction.
In response to the concerns of the SEC and others, the
Commerce Committee bill narrowed the list of exempted
transactions contained in the Banking Committee bill. For example,
the Commerce Committee bill placed additional restrictions on the
manner in which banks could conduct securities transactions in
connection with their trust, custody, safekeeping or other banking
operations without registering as a broker with the SEC.65 Several of
these restrictions are inconsistent with the manner in which many
63. See Banking Report, supra note 1, §§ 201, 202.
64. See id. § 201.
65. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 201.
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banks currently conduct their trust, custody and safekeeping
activities. In addition, the Commerce Committee bill would require
that a bank engaged in private placement activities register with the
SEC as a broker if the bank is affiliated with a registered broker or
dealer for more than one year, or if the bank privately places
securities with any person that is not a "qualified investor." The bill
would not include individuals or most corporations, regardless of
their financial resources, in the definition of "qualified investor,"
even though brokers and dealers may privately place securities with
individuals and corporations that meet certain financial criteria
specified in SEC regulations.66 Many banks have asserted that these
restrictions would unnecessarily require banks to shift their
traditional private placement activities to an affiliated broker-dealer,
or place banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their
competitors in the private placement market.67
Furthermore, the Commerce Committee bill eliminated the
exemption provided by the Banking Committee bill for trades
effected by a bank solely as an accommodation for its customers.
The Commerce Committee bill also reduced the de minimis
exemption provided in the Banking Committee bill for transactions
that do not qualify for other exemptions from 1000 transactions per
year to 500 transactions per year.
Because many banks would be unable or unwilling to comply
with the conditions contained in the Commerce Committee bill, the
bill would have the practical effect of requiring many banks to
transfer or "push out" their existing securities operations to an
affiliated entity.68 This is because banks cannot feasibly comply with
66. See id. § 206. Under the Commerce Committee bill, certain types of corporations,
such as investment companies or small business investment companies, would be
considered "qualified investors." Individuals with a net worth in excess of $1 million, or
corporations with assets in excess of $5 million, would not be considered qualified
investors under the bill, even though such persons and corporations are considered
"accredited investors" under SEC regulations. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3), (5).
67. Although the Commerce Committee bill would allow banks to engage in
transactions in "banking products" without registering as a broker or dealer, the bill would
give the SEC the authority to determine whether new products developed by banks in the
future are, in fact, banking products. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 206. Several
banking organizations have expressed fear that this provision could allow the SEC to stymie
the development of new and innovative banking products and harm the competitiveness of
the banking industry.
68. S. 298 would prohibit any insured bank that is affiliated with a financial services
[Vol. 2
FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION
the SEC's minimum net capital rules and, therefore, cannot satisfy
the SEC's requirements for registration as a broker or dealer.69
The banking industry contends that the Commerce
Committee bill would disrupt the traditional operations of many
banks. As noted above, many of the securities transactions
conducted by banks are integrally related to, and connected with,
traditional bank functions, such as trust, custody and safekeeping
operations. Requiring banks to transfer the securities-related
segments of such activities to a separate organization, it is argued,
would result in the artificial bifurcation of these functions and
impose unnecessary additional costs on many banks.
E. Insurance Activities of Banks
The insurance provisions of the proposed bills are clearly the
most contentious. Because of the passions raised by previous
attempts to address the insurance activities of banks and their
affiliates, Congressman Leach had originally considered proposing
legislation that was silent or at least "neutral" on the question of
insurance activities and affiliations. In the end, however, the issues
could not be avoided, and a resolution of the insurance issues
continues to be elusive.
At heart are two basic questions regarding the insurance
activities of banks: what is insurance, and to what extent should the
insurance activities of national banks be subject to state insurance
regulation. The insurance industry approaches these issues from the
perspective of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,7" which has reserved to
the states the authority to define and regulate insurance activities.
Insurance agents are concerned that any erosion or preemption of
state insurance regulation-including rules governing licensing,
continuing education and sales practices-by a federal banking
holding company from engaging in any securities activities, either as principal or agent,
except for transactions in United States obligations or transactions that may be conducted
by a national bank's trust department. See S. 298, 105th Cong. § 101(g) (1997).
Accordingly, S. 298 would explicitly require that many insured banks transfer or "push out"
their non-trust-related securities activities to a separately incorporated affiliate.
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1. Because the SEC's net capital rules are generally
based on measures of liquidity, they would impose economically prohibitive capital
requirements on banks, which hold a significant volume of loans and other illiquid assets.
70. Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
19981
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
agency could put insurance agents at a competitive disadvantage.
Insurance companies worry that differences between insurance and
bank capital requirements and regulation could similarly give banks
that choose to underwrite insurance products directly an advantage
over insurance companies, particularly as new products are
developed that may be hybrids of banking and insurance products.
These concerns are much like those expressed by the SEC and some
members of the securities industry concerning the securities activities
of banks, with the SEC and members of the securities industry
concerned that' banks may derive a competitive advantage in
conducting securities brokerage and dealing activities because banks
are exempt from the federal securities law requirements governing
registered broker-dealers.
The banking industry, on the other hand, approaches these
issues armed with two Supreme Court decisions that allow national
banks to conduct insurance agency activities despite state statutes
prohibiting affiliations between banks and insurance companies or
agents, and that could permit the Comptroller to determine what
products constitute "insurance" for purposes of the NBA.7 The
banking industry has been adamant that legislation not erode these
decisions. In particular, the banking industry is concerned that
allowing full functional regulation of bank insurance activities by
state insurance supervisors could permit certain states to adopt
onerous regulation designed effectively to prohibit banks from
conducting insurance activities. Banks, like the insurance industry,
are also aware that the financial marketplace is rapidly changing, and
are concerned that banks not be frozen out of developing new
banking products that might have some of the aspects of, or be
replacements for, insurance products.
1. Legislative Responses
Both the Banking Committee and Commerce Committee bills
would permit subsidiaries of national banks to engage in general
insurance agency activities.72 The Commerce Committee would
71. See Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996); NationsBank v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Company, 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
72. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 141; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 121.
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require a bank that is not currently engaged in insurance agency
activities in a new state to begin its insurance agency activities in that
new state by acquiring a company that has been licensed for at least
two years to conduct insurance agency activities in that state."
Both bills would also prohibit a national bank and its
subsidiaries from underwriting non-credit related insurance. This
prohibition raises the important question: what is insurance? Both
committee bills begin with the same core definition. Insurance is
defined as any product that was regulated under state law as
insurance as of January 1, 1997, and any annuity that qualifies for tax
deferral status.74
The difference in the bills centers on how to treat new
products developed after January 1, 1997. The Banking Committee
bill defines insurance to include any new form of an old insurance
product." Thus, any new product offered by a bank that is found by
a state insurance supervisor to be a variation of an existing insurance
product could not be offered by a national bank as principal.
This definition and its attendant prohibition on new products
brings into stark relief the tension caused by the interplay between
state insurance laws and the proposed federal modernization bills. A
state insurance supervisor may have valid reasons for defining a new
product to be an insurance product, including allowing insurance
companies to offer that product under the supervision of the state.
However, a consequence of that determination under the Banking
Committee bill would be that national banks might be forbidden
from offering the same product as principal-even if banks had
originally developed the product. This problem is particularly acute
for bankers because at worst it is unclear how an insurance
supervisor's decision in one state would affect a bank's business in
another state, and at best the definition creates the potential for a
patch-work of state insurance definitions that would make it
extremely difficult for a bank to offer its products on an interstate
basis.
Because the insurance definition is key to the development of
73. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 305.
74. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 151; Commerce Report, supra note 2, §
304(c).
75. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 151.
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future products for both the insurance and the banking industry, it is
bound to result in definitional disputes. Attempting to establish a
dispute resolution process meant grappling with the question whether
any agency should be granted deference in interpreting the statutory
definition of insurance. The banking industry was loathe to give up
the success achieved in several recent Supreme Court decisions that
confirm that the Comptroller is entitled to deference in interpreting
banking laws under the Comptroller's jurisdiction.76 On the other
hand, the insurance industry demanded that any dispute resolution
process be neutral.
To address this, the Banking Committee bill established a
process within the NBA that allowed any state insurance supervisor
to petition the newly created National Council for review of any
decision by the Comptroller that a new product is permissible for a
national bank to provide as principal." Upon the filing of a petition
for review, the National Council is required to refer the matter to the
Fed for a determination as to whether a substantial question is raised.
If the Fed determines that a substantial question is raised, the
National Council is required to review the matter and may hold a
hearing. Any affected party may then appeal the National Council's
decision to a U.S. court of appeals. At the insistence of the insurance
industry, the Banking Committee bill required the U.S. court of
appeals to review the matter de novo.
In the banking industry's view, the Banking Committee bill
appeared to favor the insurance industry on the definition of
insurance. As explained below, the Banking Committee bill
balanced this favoritism with strong provisions overriding state anti-
affiliation laws, to the benefit of the banking industry.
The Commerce Committee version, which came several
months and many hours of negotiation after the Banking Committee
bill, made several revisions to both the definition of insurance and
the dispute resolution process. The Commerce Committee added an
exclusion from the definition of insurance for any new product that is
a core banking product (that is, a deposit, loan, letter of credit, other
extension of credit, trust or fiduciary service, financial guaranty or
76. See, e.g., VALIC, 513 U.S. 251.
77. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 151.
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qualified financial contract) unless the new product would qualify for
treatment as insurance under designated provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.7" The addition of this exclusion took away some of
the advantage gained by the insurance industry in the original
definition and would allow the banking industry to continue to
develop and offer as principal new products that are related to core
banking products, even if these products were found by the states to
be insurance products. It is still unclear whether this approach will
resolve the dispute between the banking and insurance industries
about future products.
The Commerce Committee bill also revised the process for
resolving disputes about the definition of insurance. The Commerce
Committee bill dropped the administrative review process (along
with the National Council) and, instead, provided for expedited
review of disputes in the U.S. district courts.79 Thus, the Commerce
Committee bill substituted a lower court's review for an
administrative review process.
Because of concern that the courts would defer to the
interpretation of the federal bank supervisory agencies on the
question of whether a new product was a banking product, the
Commerce Committee bill enacted the insurance provision as a free
standing provision (not as an amendment to the NBA, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act or the BHC Act) and required the court to
review de novo any definition question presented under state or
federal law "without unequal deference."8
Interestingly, the Commerce Committee bill appears to be
more favorable to the banking industry on the definition of insurance
than the Banking Committee bill. However, the insurance agents
won concessions to the anti-affiliation provisions in the Commerce
Committee bill that are less favorable to the banking industry than
78. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 304(c)(2). The exclusion is very complex.
It excludes from the definition of insurance any new product that is a core banking product
(as described above) unless (1) the product would qualify as life insurance under the
Internal Revenue Code if the product were offered by an insurance company, or (2) the
product is a deposit, trust or fiduciary product or service that would qualify as any other
type of insurance contract under the Internal Revenue Code if offered by an insurance
company.
79. See id. § 307.
80. See id.
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the anti-affiliation provisions of the Banking Committee bill.
The anti-affiliation provisions in the two bills arose in the
context of agreement between the two committees that banks should
be permitted to affiliate with insurance companies and insurance
agencies in a holding company structure. As noted above, both the
Banking Committee bill and the Commerce Committee bill would
repeal the provisions of the 1982 Gain-St. Germain Act that currently
prevent bank holding companies from engaging through a
nonbanking affiliate in insurance agency and insurance underwriting
activities. This would allow the broad affiliation of banks and
insurance underwriters, agents and brokers.
Because some states have laws that prevent the affiliation of
banks and insurance companies or insurance agencies, both the
Banking Committee bill and the Commerce Committee bill contain
provisions that override these state anti-affiliation laws. This
override, which may be found in section 104 of both bills, contains
two parts: one that addresses affiliation, and a second that addresses
regulation of activities that are conducted by a bank either directly or
in conjunction with an affiliate. This second part affects the ability
of states to regulate the direct insurance activities of banks.
Both the Banking Committee bill and the Commerce
Committee bill override state laws that "prevent or restrict" the
affiliation of insured depository institutions and uninsured wholesale
financial institutions (WFIs),8 ' on the one hand, and insurance
underwriters, insurance agencies, securities firms, merchant banking
firms and companies engaged in financial activities, on the other
hand. The Banking Committee bill goes further to override all state
laws that would "prevent or restrict" affiliations between an insured
depository institution or WFI and any company authorized under any
other provision of law. This override provision has been preferred
by many in the banking industry because it prevents states from
prohibiting or restricting any affiliation that would be permissible
under the NBA, the BHC Act, the Home Owners Loan Act or any
other law, thereby extending the override to a broad range of
activities.
81. Both bills would authorize the creation of WFIs as a new form of depository
institution. WFIs could receive deposits only in amounts of $100,000 or more (except on
an incidental and occasional basis) and such deposits would not be insured by the FDIC.
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The second part of the override provisions in both committee
bills addresses state laws that regulate the activities of banks. There
are several important differences between the Banking and
Commerce Committee bills in this area.
The Banking Committee bill adopts the same broad approach
to overriding state laws that attempt to govern the direct activities of
insured depository institutions as the bill uses for overriding anti-
affiliation laws. In particular, the Banking Committee bill would
override any state law that "prevents or restricts" any insured
depository institution or WFI from engaging directly--or with any
affiliate-in any activity authorized under the bill or any other
provision of law. As with the anti-affiliation provision, this override
applies to all insured depository institutions and overrides state laws
governing any type of activity that a depository institution is
otherwise authorized to conduct under any law. For example, this
appears to override any state law that "prevents or restricts" a
national bank from engaging in any activity permitted under the
NBA-including insurance activities. The Banking Committee bill
leaves room to argue that various types of state insurance regulation
may "restrict" a bank from conducting insurance activities that are
otherwise authorized for the bank.
The insurance industry was concerned that the Banking
Committee bill provided an override that was arguably broader than
even the Barnett Bank decision. In response to these concerns, the
Commerce Committee bill is more limited in several important
respects. First, it applies only to national banks and WFIs, leaving
state banks to contend with all state laws that govern the activities of
state banks. Second, the override applies to a more limited list of
activities (primarily securities, insurance, merchant banking and
financial activities) and does not, as does the Banking Committee
bill, sweep in any activity that is permitted under the NBA or other
law. Third, this provision rejects the override of laws that "restrict"
the activities of banks and attempts to codify the standard in Barnett
Bank that addresses laws that "prevent or significantly interfere with"
the ability of a national bank to conduct an activity.
The Commerce Committee also added several other
provisions that affect the scope of the override contained in section
104. For example, the Commerce Committee bill requires any
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person selling insurance to be "functionally regulated" and prohibits
any person or entity from providing insurance as principal or agent
unless the person or entity is licensed by the appropriate State
insurance regulator." These provisions appear to conflict with the
override contained in section 104. As a result, these provisions were
opposed by the banking industry, though a compromise was under
discussion at the time Congress recessed that would reconcile these
provisions with cross-references to section 104.8
2. Conclusion Regarding Insurance Provisions
The insurance issues pose the most difficult obstacle to the
passage of financial modernization legislation. The differences
between the insurance provisions of the Banking Committee and the
Commerce Committee bills reflect an evolution in the discussions
between members of the banking and insurance industries as the
legislative process has proceeded and different attempts have been
made to reach a compromise. However, the issues have so far
proven to defy resolution.
Progress made in this area may be the bellwether for financial
modernization legislation as a whole. Indeed, many believe that the
other issues in the Banking Committee and Commerce Committee
bills could be resolved relatively quickly if a solution to the
insurance puzzle could be worked out.
82. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, §§ 302, 303.
83. S. 298 would prohibit any insured depository institution subsidiary of a financial
services holding company from directly underwriting insurance. See S. 298, 105th Cong. §
101(g) (1997). The bill, however, does not attempt to define what constitutes "insurance"
for these purposes, nor does it create a procedure for resolving disputes regarding the scope
of the term. With respect to state regulation of the insurance activities of banks and their
affiliates, the bill would specifically preempt any state law that (1) prevents or impedes a
subsidiary insured depository institution of a financial services holding company from
being affiliated with an insurance company or insurance agent, or (2) prevents a subsidiary
insured depository institution from engaging in cross-marketing activities with any
affiliated insurance company or insurance agent. See id. at § 101(f). The legislative history
of the bill indicates, however, that the bill is not intended to preempt any state insurance
approval, examination, licensing or reporting requirements that do not discriminate against




Another issue that has engendered considerable debate is
whether national banks should be permitted to engage indirectly
through a so-called "operating subsidiary" in activities that national
banks are not authorized to conduct directly. Although expanding
the range of permissible activities and affiliations of bank holding
companies would greatly reduce the need to resolve this issue
legislatively, recent administrative actions by the Comptroller have
kept this question on the forefront of Congressional debates on
financial modernization.
1. Precipitating Actions of the Comptroller
In 1997, the Comptroller adopted regulations authorizing
national banks to establish operating subsidiaries to engage in
activities that a national bank cannot engage in directly. 4 Acting
under this new regulation, the Comptroller in December 1997,
approved the application of a national bank to engage, through an
operating subsidiary, in underwriting and dealing in municipal
revenue bonds-an activity that the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits a
national bank from conducting directly." The Comptroller also is
considering two proposals by another national bank to establish
operating subsidiaries to engage in real estate development and real
estate leasing activities, and the Comptroller's regulation is broad
enough to permit operating subsidiaries of national banks to engage
in other types of financial or nonfinancial activities.
Several members of Congress have criticized the
Comptroller's actions in this area and have questioned whether
existing law permits a national bank to control a subsidiary that
engages in activities that the bank cannot conduct directly. The Fed
also has expressed serious doubts that Congress intended to create a
statutory scheme that would allow the Comptroller to override
84. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f) (1997).
85. See Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Zions First
National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah, to Commence New Activities in an Operating
Subsidiary, Dec. 11, 1997 (on file with the OCC and also available on the internet at
<http://www.occ.treas.gov>).
1998]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
express statutory prohibitions on the activities of national banks by
administrative action.86 Although some observers believe that the
Fed's position on this matter represents merely a "turf' battle with
the Comptroller, the Comptroller's operating subsidiary regulation
has serious public policy implications related to the proper role of the
federal safety net.
In light of the unique function that banks serve in the
American economy, banks, unlike other forms of business
organizations, benefit from the direct and indirect government
guarantees provided through the federal safety net, which refers to
FDIC deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve's discount
window and payments system. While these governmental guarantees
protect depositors and reduce the likelihood of damaging bank runs,
they also allow banks to borrow funds at a lower cost than other
nonbank entities. Although some contend that this funding benefit is
offset by the special regulatory costs imposed on banks,87 Chairman
Greenspan has testified that access to the federal safety net, and the
explicit and implicit government guarantees associated therewith,
provide banks with a net subsidy that is not available to other
organizations.8
Operating subsidiaries that are established or funded with
low-cost funds raised by the parent bank also benefit indirectly from
the federal safety net. Accordingly, the Comptroller's proposal to
permit operating subsidiaries of national banks to engage in activities
impermissible for banks to conduct directly could result in the
indirect expansion of the federal safety to cover a range of activities
that Congress has decided should not be protected by governmental
guarantees. In addition, operating subsidiaries that are funded with
86. See Letter from William W. Wiles, Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board, to the
Honorable Eugene Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency (May 5, 1997).
87. See, e.g., Bevis Longstreth and Ivan E. Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks:
The Case in Support, 97 CoLUM. L. REV. 1895, 1917-19 (1997) (reviewing evidence that
banks do not receive a net subsidy from their access to the federal safety net and concluding
that the ultimate value of the safety net is marginal, if not negative, to all but the smallest of
banking institutions).
88. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 26, at 72-74 (statement of Alan
Greenspan). A recent study by economists at the Federal Reserve Board also concluded
that banks receive a net subsidy through their access to the federal safety net. See MYRON
L. KWAST & S. WAYNE PASSMORE, THE SUBSIDY PROVIDED BY THE FEDERAL SAFETY NET:
THEORY, MEAsuREMET AND CONTAINMEm (1997).
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low-cost funds raised by the parent bank would have an unfair
competitive advantage over other business organizations that lack
access to the federal safety net.
Furthermore, allowing operating subsidiaries of national
banks to engage in activities that are not permissible for national
banks could increase the risk of loss to the bank and the FDIC
insurance funds. In this regard, a national bank would likely face
significant pressure to support an operating subsidiary in financial
difficulty. This is especially true because any losses at the subsidiary
would have to be consolidated with the parent bank's financial
statements under generally accepted accounting principles and, thus,
would have a negative impact on the bank's consolidated earnings
and financial reports provided to investors and the public. Even if a
parent bank did not provide financial support to an operating
subsidiary in distress, any publicity concerning the financial
difficulties of the subsidiary could cause depositors or creditors to
lose confidence in the parent bank.
The Comptroller contends that these risks and concerns are
adequately addressed by limitations or conditions contained in the
proposal, including a requirement that transactions between a
national bank and its operating subsidiary comply with sections 23A
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, and a requirement that a
national bank deduct its equity investment in an operating subsidiary
from its capital and total assets for purposes of determining the
bank's compliance with regulatory minimum capital guidelines. 9
The Comptroller's proposal, however, does not subject a national
bank's equity investment in an operating subsidiary to the limits
contained in section 23A and, thus, would not limit the amount of
low-cost capital that a national bank could downstream to an
operating subsidiary. Moreover, sections 23A and 23B do not today
cover the complete range of financial relationships that may exist
between a national bank and an operating subsidiary and, as noted
above, are not always fully effective in protecting a bank from the
risks arising from transactions with affiliates, especially in times of
financial stress.9" The restrictions proposed by the Comptroller also
89. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f)(2)-(3) (1997).
90. See supra note 52 (discussing supervisory experience with the First Options
subsidiary of Continental Bank).
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would not fully address the contagion risks that necessarily arise
from allowing a national bank to control and manage an operating
subsidiary whose financial condition will necessarily be reflected in
the parent bank's public financial statements, i.e. the risk that losses
at the operating subsidiary will cause depositors or creditors to lose
confidence in the subsidiary's parent bank.
Furthermore, although the Comptroller's proposal would
require that a national bank's equity investment in an operating
subsidiary be deducted from the bank's capital and total assets for
purposes of determining the bank's regulatory capital, it is unclear
whether the proposal would require a similar deduction for the
retained earnings of the operating subsidiary. Under generally
accepted accounting principles, the retained earnings of a subsidiary
would be consolidated with the capital account of the parent bank.
Accordingly, if the Comptroller's proposal does not require that the
operating subsidiary's retained earnings be deducted from the parent
bank's capital, then a significant portion of the bank's regulatory
capital could consist of the retained earnings of an operating
subsidiary and, thus, be at risk to losses incurred by the operating
subsidiary.
2. Legislative Responses
The Banking Committee bill would authorize national banks
to control operating subsidiaries engaged in certain activities that a
national bank cannot engage in directly, including underwriting and
dealing in all types of securities.9' The Banking Committee bill also
would permit the operating subsidiaries of national banks to engage
in any other activity that the National Council determined to be
financially related. The bill would, however, prohibit any operating
subsidiary of a national bank from underwriting noncredit-related
insurance or engaging in real estate development or merchant
banking activities.
To mitigate the potentially adverse effects of the proposal, the
Banking Committee bill would impose certain "firewalls" on the
91. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 141. S. 298 does not directly address the issue
of whether national banks may control operating subsidiaries engaged in activities that are
impermissible for national banks to conduct directly.
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relationship between a national bank and its operating subsidiaries.
For example, the bill would require that any extensions of credit by
national banks to their operating subsidiaries comply with sections
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, but would exempt a
national bank's equity investment in an operating subsidiary from the
quantitative limits contained in section 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act.92 The bill would also require that a national bank deduct its
equity investment in an operating subsidiary from its tangible equity
and assets for purposes of determining the bank's compliance with
regulatory capital requirements. These restrictions are similar to
those contained in the Comptroller's operating subsidiary proposal.
In addition, to address the risks inherent in the parent-
subsidiary relationship, the Banking Committee bill would provide
that, notwithstanding any other law, a national bank (or other insured
depository institution) could not be held liable for the obligations of
its subsidiaries or affiliates by "piercing the corporate veil" between
such entities.93 In effect, this provision would prohibit any party,
including the creditors or customers of an operating subsidiary, from
obtaining redress against the parent bank of an operating subsidiary
for obligations undertaken or damages caused by the subsidiary.
The Commerce Committee bill, on the other hand, would
generally prohibit subsidiaries of national banks from engaging in
any activity that national banks are not permitted to conduct directly,
unless otherwise specifically authorized by a federal statute.94 Thus,
a national bank would continue to have the authority to control Edge
Act corporations. In addition, the bill would specifically authorize
national banks to control operating subsidiaries engaged in general
insurance agency activities.95 Agency activities generally involve
little risk and require only minimal capital investments. Authorizing
operating subsidiaries to engage in general insurance agency
activities thus would not appear to significantly increase the risks to
the deposit insurance funds or create significant funding advantages
for national banks.
The Commerce Committee also believed it was improper to
92. See id. § 143.
93. See id. § 113.
94. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 121.
95. See id.
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prohibit consumers, creditors or the general public from "piercing the
corporate veil" between a bank and its subsidiaries or affiliates under
all circumstances, including when such action may be appropriate to
redress fraud or other injustices under established principles of
American law. Accordingly, the Commerce Committee deleted the
provisions of the Banking Committee bill that would have prohibited
any court or authority from "piercing the corporate veil" for purposes
of holding an insured depository institution liable for the debts of a
subsidiary or affiliate.
G. Merger of Thrift and Banking Charters
One goal of some proponents of financial modernization is to
rationalize the legal structure of the banking industry, which for
historical reasons is divided between organizations with bank
charters and organizations with thrift charters. Proposals to merge
the thrift and banking charters, however, have sparked significant
controversy and conflict between the banking and thrift industries.
1. Background to Debate
The severe financial difficulties experienced by the thrift
industry in the 1980s substantially depleted the federal deposit
insurance fund that insured thrift deposits and forced Congress to
engineer a comprehensive bailout package for the thrift industry,
including moving the thrift deposit insurance fund to the FDIC and
renaming it the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). During
this period, Congress also established a new special purpose
corporation, the Financing Corporation (FICO), which raised billions
of dollars to partially finance the thrift bailout by issuing long-term
bonds, the last of which matures in 2019. The interest on these
bonds was to be paid by the thrift industry through FDIC
assessments on the SAIF-insured deposits of thrifts.
By the mid-1990s, however, the SAIF insurance fund
remained significantly below its legislatively required level of
reserves, despite the fact that the FDIC's assessment rate for SAIF-
insured thrifts was measurably higher than the assessment rate for
banks, whose deposits are insured by the separate Bank Insurance
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Fund (BIF). In light of this assessment rate differential, many
institutions began exploring ways to shift their deposits from the
SAIF to the BIF. The weak financial condition of the SAIF, and the
runoff in SAIF-insured deposits, raised the distinct possibility that
the thrift industry would be unable to pay the approximately $780
million in annual interest due on the FICO bonds.
To respond to this new thrift crisis, Congress passed the
Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996 (1996 Act).96 The 1996 Act
imposed a special one-time assessment on the SAIF-insured deposits
of thrifts to bring the fund up to its required level of reserves. The
1996 Act also required that banks pay a significant portion of the
interest on the FICO bonds.97 Not unexpectedly, the banking
industry initially opposed Congressional efforts to require banks to
pay a portion of the continuing costs of the savings and loan bailout.
As a general matter, the banking industry believed that it was
inequitable to require healthy banks to pay a portion of the tab for the
losses incurred by their thrift competitors during the 1980s.
Nevertheless, the banking industry eventually agreed to accept partial
liability for the interest on the FICO bonds and did not object to
passage of the 1996 Act.
Many in the banking industry, however, believe their
agreement to accept partial responsibility for repaying the FICO
bonds was based on an understanding with members of Congress and
the thrift industry that Congress would eliminate the thrift charter
and require thrifts to convert to banking charters in the near future.
Representative Leach is reported to have indicated that such an
understanding was, in fact, reached in connection with the 1996 Act9
and the text of the 1996 Act indicates that Congress contemplated the
elimination of the thrift charter by 1999. 99 In light of this avowed
96. The Deposit Insurance Funds Act of 1996 Act was enacted as part of the Economic
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, which itself was enacted as
Title II of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 Act].
97. Under the 1996 Act, the banking industry will pay approximately $322 million of
the annual interest on the FICO bonds through the year 1999, and approximately $608
million of the bonds' annual interest thereafter.
98. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Leach: Thrift Execs Broke Vow to Support Killing
S&L Charter, AM. BANKER, Dec. 9, 1997, at 2.
99. Specifically, the 1996 Act called for the merger of the SAIF and BIF insurance
funds on January 1, 1999, but provided that the merger of insurance funds could occur only
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understanding, the banking industry and certain members of
Congress have sought to ensure that any financial modernization
legislation includes provisions eliminating the thrift charter.
The thrift industry, on the other hand, has generally taken the
position that no understanding was reached in 1996 regarding the
elimination of the thrift charter. °° The thrift industry also has
expressed concern that the mandatory conversion of thrifts to banks
could eliminate the special powers that currently are enjoyed by
thrifts and thrift holding companies but that are not available to
national banks or bank holding companies. For example, unlike
national banks, thrifts are permitted to own subsidiary service
corporations that may engage in general insurance agency activities
and a wide variety of commercial activities, including investing in
and developing real estate. Thrifts also may branch nationwide
without restriction, and the OTS has taken the position that most
state laws that regulate the lending or deposit-taking operations of a
federal thrift are preempted.'0' In addition, unitary thrift holding
companies, unlike bank holding companies, currently are permitted
to engage in commercial activities to an unlimited extent.
2. Legislative Responses
The bills passed by both the Banking Committee and the
Commerce Committee would eliminate the thrift charter within two
years of enactment. °2 Both bills provide that all federal savings
associations in existence two years after the date of enactment shall
be converted into national banks by operation of law.' In addition,
the bills provide that all state savings associations in existence on
that date would be treated as state banks for purposes of federal
banking law.'
Both bills also seek to limit the impact these changes would
if the thrift and banking charter were merged before that date. See 1996 Act, supra note 96,
§ 2704.
100. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, supra note 98, at 2 (citing president of America's
Community Bankers).
101. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.2, 560.2 (1997).
102. S. 298, on the other hand, would not abolish the thrift charter and, thus, would
continue the separate existence of the thrift industry.
103. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 311; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 411.
104. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 321; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 421.
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have on thrifts and thrift holding companies by bestowing certain
grandfather rights on existing thrifts and thrift holding companies.
For example, both bills would generally permit any federal savings
association that converts to a national bank to continue to engage in
those activities (including the holding of any asset) that the savings
association was lawfully engaged in prior to conversion." 5 Both bills
would also grandfather the activities of thrift holding companies that
become bank holding companies upon the conversion of their
subsidiary thrifts. In particular, both bills would permit a thrift
holding company to engage, after conversion to a bank holding
company, in any activity that was permissible for the thrift holding
company to engage in prior to conversion.0 6 Thus, both bills would
accord grandfather rights to an activity that a thrift holding company
commences after its conversion to a bank holding company, so long
as that activity would have generally been permissible for thrift
holding companies prior to conversion.
Although the thrift provisions of the Banking Committee and
Commerce Committee bills are generally similar, two differences are
worthy of mentioning. First, the Banking Committee bill would
permit a converting thrift holding company to retain its grandfather
rights even if the company acquires additional banks through
merger."7 Under this authority, a unitary thrift holding company
with extensive, grandfathered commercial activities could acquire
control of additional banks and thereby acquire a significant banking
presence. In light of this possibility, some have noted that the
Banking Committee bill could permit a small number of
grandfathered thrift holding companies to gain a significant
competitive advantage over other players in the financial services
industry. To address these concerns, the Commerce Committee bill
provides that a converting thrift holding company will lose its
grandfather rights if it acquires control of additional banks through
105. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 313(a); Commerce Report, supra note 2,
§ 413(a).
106. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 316; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 416.
107. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 316. To avoid losing its grandfather rights,
the thrift holding company must merge any bank acquired into the company's subsidiary
national bank, and continue to operate its subsidiary national bank in accordance with the
QTL test.
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merger."8
Second, certain provisions of the Banking Committee bill
could be interpreted to grant all national banks the powers and
privileges of federal savings associations.0 9 Some have expressed
concern that, if the Banking Committee bill was interpreted in this
manner, the bill would have the effect of continuing the thrift charter
by simply fusing its characteristics onto the national bank charter.
For example, some note that this provision could grant all national
banks the power to open de novo branches nationwide, a result which
would appear contrary to the limits imposed by the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Branching and Efficiency Act of 1994 on the de novo
branching of national banks."'
Moreover, because federal savings associations are permitted
to engage in a wide variety of commercial activities through service
corporations-including investing in real estate, owning and
operating nursing homes and hotels, and investing in air conditioning
and solar heating companies-opponents of mixing banking and
commerce have generally resisted proposals that would allow all
national banks to "charter up," i.e. receive the powers of federal
savings associations. To avoid ambiguities regarding this matter, the
Commerce Committee bill eliminated those provisions of the
Banking Committee bill that could be interpreted as granting all
national banks the powers and privileges of federal savings
associations.
H. Consumer Protection
Proposals to expand the permissible activities of banking
organizations promise to offer consumers greater choices,
convenience and flexibility in the purchase of financial services.
Consumer groups, however, have expressed concern that the
expansion of bank activities could create conflicts of interests that
endanger the ability of banks to make vital credit decisions in an
108. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 416.
109. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 322.
110. See Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338, § 103(a) (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
36(g)). Under the Riegle-Neal Act, a national bank may establish a de novo branch only in
those states that expressly permit such branching.
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impartial manner, result in public confusion regarding the uninsured
status of any securities or insurance products sold by a bank or a
bank affiliate, or weaken the commitment of banks to their local
communities. The challenge facing Congress is how to assure that
financial modernization occurs in a manner that minimizes the
potential for these adverse effects without subjecting banks or their
affiliates to unnecessary or overly burdensome regulation.
Under both the Banking Committee and Commerce
Committee bills, a bank holding company can qualify as a financial
services holding company, and thus affiliate with a broad range of
securities, insurance and other financial firms, only if all of the
company's banking subsidiaries have a "satisfactory" or better record
of meeting community credit needs under the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (12 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq.). Unlike the
Commerce Committee bill, the Banking Committee bill would also
require that the subsidiary banks of a bank holding company seeking
broad financial powers have a demonstrable record of providing low-
cost "lifeline" bank accounts.'
2
In addition, under the Banking Committee bill, a bank
holding company that directly or indirectly underwrites or sells
annuities or insurance contracts may benefit from broad financial
affiliations only if the company is not in violation of the Fair
Housing Act (FHA) or any consent decree or settlement agreement
arising from an alleged violation of the FHA." 3 This requirement
has proven very controversial, as members of the insurance industry
have expressed concern that it could foreshadow efforts to subject the
insurance industry in general to the FHA or a similar statutory
scheme. In light of these concerns, the Commerce Committee bill
did not include a similar FHA-compliance requirement for financial
services holding companies.
Both the Banking Committee and Commerce Committee bills
would also authorize the federal banking agencies to impose
11. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 103; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 103.
Both bills provide a limited exception from this requirement for subsidiary banks that were
recently acquired by the bank holding company. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 103;
Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 103.
112. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 103.
113. See id.
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restrictions on transactions between banks and their affiliates to
prevent conflicts of interest or other abuses, or to enhance the privacy
of bank customers. Although both bills would authorize the Fed to
adopt such prudential safeguards for the bank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies, the Banking Committee bill would also permit
the three federal banking agencies (the Fed, Comptroller and the
FDIC) to adopt similar safeguards for any bank within their primary
jurisdiction." 4
Both bills also require that the federal banking agencies adopt
consumer protection regulations governing the retail sale of certain
nondeposit investment products by banks or on bank premises.'"
The bills include an extensive list of matters that must be addressed
in these regulations, including the prohibition of coercive practices,
the physical separation of banking and nonbanking activities and the
establishment of a consumer grievance process. In addition, the
regulations must require that consumers receive disclosures
concerning the uninsured status of, and the investment risks
associated with, a nondeposit investment product, such as statements
that the product is "NOT FDIC-INSURED" and is "NOT
GUARANTEED BY THE BANK."
The Banking Committee bill requires that the consumer
protection regulations promulgated by the banking agencies cover
the sale of all nondeposit investment products by banks or on bank
premises. 6 Because the Commerce Committee bill would give the
SEC jurisdiction over many of the securities activities of banks, the
Commerce Committee bill would require that the regulations adopted
by the federal banking agencies cover only the retail sale of
insurance products by banks or on bank premises." 7
Finally, the Commerce Committee bill would require that the
federal banking agencies issue regulations prohibiting insurance
underwriters or agents from discriminating against victims of
domestic violence by taking into account a person's status as a victim
in connection with the underwriting, renewal or pricing of insurance
114. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 111; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 114.
115. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 112; Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 308.
116. See Banking Report, supra note 1, § 112.
117. See Commerce Report, supra note 2, § 308.
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products."' This provision, which was offered by Representative
DeGette of Colorado and added to the Commerce Committee bill by
a voice vote, at the markup, would govern only those insurance
products sold by an insured depository institution or at the offices of
an insured depository institution. 19
IV. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing illustrates, the web of issues and interests
facing Congressional efforts to reform this nation's financial laws is
formidable. Although the Banking Committee and Commerce
Committee each have made significant progress in addressing many
of these issues and balancing the relevant interests, the differences
between the bills reported out by these committees only highlight the
problems that members of Congress will have in forging an
acceptable compromise in the final session of the 105th Congress.
Any compromise must address several contentious disputes-
including the questions regarding bank insurance and securities
activities and the elimination of the thrift charter-that have
successfully evaded the conciliation efforts of many over the years.
Nevertheless, hope springs eternal that the 105th Congress will
overcome these challenges and fashion financial modernization
legislation that not only satisfies the necessary political interests, but
also places this nation's financial system on sound footing for
entering the 21 st century.
118. Seeid. §308.
119. As a general matter, S. 298 would not impose, or require the federal banking
agencies to promulgate, special consumer protection requirements. See S. 298, 105th Cong.
(1997).
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